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 Abstract 
 
The Chinese stock exchange is naturally characterized by information asymmetry, 
inequality between the supply and demand of certain IPOs due to its relatively high 
economic uncertainty inherent from the previous privatization process. Meanwhile 
whether to adopt underwriter reputation as an explanatory factor for the IPO 
underpricing remains to be a controversial issue due to the immature underwriting 
system in China. This paper investigates the potential factors derived from the 
information asymmetry model, signaling model and the theory of inequality to 
analyze the underpricing of the Chinese A-share IPOs from January, 2000 to 
September, 2004. The initial return is discovered to be 84.14327%, which is in a 
rational level in comparison to the previous findings. In addition, the results of this 
investigation advocate that the initial return in this period is considerably 
influenced by information asymmetry and imbalance of supply and demand for 
IPOs. However, the signaling model is found to have little stochastic explanatory 
power for the level of IPO underpricing within the sample period. Furthermore, 
underwriter reputation is clarified to be of little significance to elaborate on the IPO 
underpricing in Chinese security market. 
 
Keywords: IPO underpricing, information asymmetry, signaling, inequality between 
supply and demand theory, underwriter reputation 
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1. Introduction 
 
The underpricing of certain initial public offerings is a widespread phenomenon 
occurs worldwide with the level of underpricing varying from nation to nation. 
Generally, when there are companies going public, some specific shares seemingly 
to be priced lower than the market price. Underpricing is usually measured as the 
proportion difference between the price at which the shares are exchanged in the 
secondary market and the price at which the stocks are sold to the potential 
investors during the period of IPO listing. The highest first day initial returns are 
found by Chen, Firth and Kim (2004) to appear in the Chinese A-share stock market 
and peaked at 948%. Such a high level of IPO underprcing in China is extremely 
appealed to a number of academics who are enthusiastic in analyzing and 
explaining the reasons for this unusual high level of IPO underpricing in China.  
 
In retrospect, the history of Chinese IPOs starts from the middle of 1980s when the 
first IPO was listed as a component of an experimental joint stock system. The 
stock exchange in China is still rather primitive and immature in comparison to 
other security markets in the developed countries since it has not been established 
until the later period of 1990. The provisions of the new-issued shares are limited 
by the Chinese Stock Regulation Community while the high returns of these shares 
have become the purchasing stimulator which continuously attracting numerous 
investors¶ interests and attention. Therefore, the Chinese stock market is 
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characterized by the inequality between the supply and demand for IPOs. 
Additionally, the information asymmetry is also found by Chi and Padgett (2004) to 
exist in Chinese security market due to the high government management, 
restriction and retention on the new-issued offerings. Moreover, in order to 
encourage more Chinese citizens to widely participate into the privatization process, 
the Chinese government is making efforts to construct an enthusiastically positive 
market sentiment in the Chinese stock market. This is advocated by Datar and Mao 
(1998) as one of the explanations for the IPO underpricing in China. Besides, other 
scholars including Mok and Hui (1998), Su (2004), Chan et al. (2004), Chi and 
Padgett (2005), all of whom are also attempting to figure out and understand the 
determinants of these unusual high values for the IPO initial return. Majority of 
them choose a sample period as before the 20th century at which time the Chinese 
stock market was quite immature and unstable. Therefore, it is rare for them to 
investigate the specific institutional features such as the shares allocation system 
and quota system, the high proportion of individual investors as an underlying 
factor of information asymmetry in the Chinese market. However, these issues will 
be discussed in this paper as the possible explanatory factors to describe the level 
of IPO underpricing in China. 
 
The Contribution of this article is to adopt a more updated and recent set of data to 
test the impact of the specific features of Chinese stock market on the level of IPO 
underpricing. Meanwhile, the underwriter reputation will also be employed as a 
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control variable to test its significance in explaining the underpricing of Chinese 
IPOs. Since it remains to be a controversial issue concerning whether the 
underwriter reputation can be utilized to explain the underpricing of Chinese IPOs. 
In this paper, the peculiar and unique characteristics of Chinese emerging security 
market which will probably have an impact on the level of IPO underpricing will be 
discussed in the first place. Then a sample of 293 A-share IPOs issued on both 
Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from January 2000 to 
September 2004 will be analyzed by utilizing the information asymmetry theory, 
signaling model and imbalance of demand and supply hypothesis which can help 
explain the relatively high level of IPO underpricing in China. It has been discovered 
that the initial return of IPOs in the sample period is 85.14327% which is 
considerably lower than the results of the previous study. The findings indicate that 
the theory of low supply and high demand for IPOs due to the quota system is 
appropriate to be a significant determinant of the high degree of IPO underpricing 
in China. The information asymmetry model is also found to be of some significance 
to explain the high initial returns of Chinese IPOs while the signaling model is not 
confirmed to have direct impact on the IPO underpricing. This implies that instead 
of signaling the market about the quality of issuers by issuing the shares at a lower 
price, the government only captures the opportunities to set tome for certain IPOs 
so as to receive profitable feedbacks from the market. Eventually, the involvement 
of underwriter reputation is clarified to be of little use in explaining the level of 
Chinese IPOs underpricing and this variable is found to exert little effect on the 
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other explanatory variables.  
 
The whole dissertation is organized as the following: section one will review the 
previous studies and theoretical framework that have been made on underpricing 
of IPOs. Section two describes the peculiar market and institutional features that 
have an impact on the IPO underpricing in Chinese A-share stock exchange. In 
section three, the theoretical methodology and hypothesis will be described. In the 
next section, the OLS regression model will be adopted to analyze the degree of IPO 
underpricing in China. Thereafter the detailed discussion and description about how 
the selected control variables will affect the IPO initial return. Meanwhile, the 
possible reasons for explaining the estimated correlation between the independent 
and dependent variables are also mentioned in this part. Eventually, the last section 
is comprised of some summarizing marks. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
As shown from a vast majority of international studies, IPO underpricing is a 
widespread phenomenon around the world. This phenomenon is initially detected 
by Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975) who named this large proportion of initial returns as 
the mystery of IPOs. The degree of IPO underpricing is usually measured by the 
initial return of shares (INRTN) which equals to closing price of the first trading day 
minus the offer price then divided this outcome by the issue price. Meanwhile, by 
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reviewing approximately 30 studies and research within more than 25 countries, 
Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist (1994) confirm the existence of IPO underpricing 
and conclude that the underpricing level in developing markets is higher than that 
in developed markets. Another study completed by Ritter (1984, 1991), also 
displays that the price discount level in the United States has averaged around 19% 
although with certain fluctuations it may undulate from 12% to 40%. 
 
2.1 The Previous empirical studies and framework of IPO underpricing 
worldwide 
 
A variety of investigations have been conducted on IPO underpricing by financial 
scholars, some of them employs the asymmetry information hypothesis to explain 
the allocation, underpricing and performance of IPOs. For instance, ever stated that 
the information asymmetry exists between issuers and underwriters with the latter 
usually hold superior information than the former. Thus underpricing is appropriate 
and necessary to alleviate the imbalanced situation. Additionally, there is also 
information asymmetry between the informed and uninformed market 
participators as claimed by Rock (1986). IPOs are underpriced in such an 
circumstance so as to attract and compensate for the uninformed investors since 
they expose their money to the risk of stock market inefficiency. Furthermore, Allen 
and Faulhaber (1989), Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) and Welch (1989) emphasis the 
existence of information asymmetry between issuers and investors, with issuers 
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being more informed than investors. The qualified issuers are usually responsible 
for notify the investors about the high quality of their offerings by reducing the 
price of IPOs and maintaining specific shares for themselves in the meantime. 
Although such kind of behaviors may arouse high expenses to these issuers, they 
are still entitled to obtain awards from the seasoned equity offerings. Apart from 
the information asymmetry model discussed above, a variety of other models and 
hypothesis are also utilized as explanations for the underpricing of IPOs in the 
foreign countries. These models are concluded as the following:  
 
The winner¶s curse hypothesis developed by Rock (1986) With fixed-priced offers, 
he divided the potential investors into two groups, the informed and uninformed. 
The uninformed investors are confronted with the adverse-selection problem as 
they usually obtain plenty of unattractive IPOs and only a small amount of favorable 
shares. Under this condition, the expected return received by the uninformed is 
either negative or much lower than the average level. Thus it is reasonable for the 
uninformed to purchase the underpriced shares so as to compensate for this bias 
caused by the uninformed the disequilibrium of information. Signaling model is 
made on the basis of the point that underpriced IPO is not only suitable for the taste 
of the investors and it also benefits the issuers by providing them with plenty of 
high-quality future seasoned equity offerings. Welch (1989) speculates that Issuers 
in this model are usually speculated to be better informed than investors and 
underwriters. Allen and Faulhaber (1989) also stated that the phenomenon of IPO 
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underpricing is essentially a symbol of firm quality. 
 
Other studies including the moral hazard model which suppose an information 
advantage for the underwriters over the other market participants, a typical 
incentive are needed to obtain the trustworthy news from these informative 
underwriters. Dynamic information acquisition model (Benveniste and Spindt, 
1989),  
 
The monopsony model proposed by logue (1973) is probably the most direct way to 
explain underpricing. It regards the issuing price as a specific type of bargaining 
power of the underwriting issues against companies. This notion is also 
recommended by Chalk and Peavy (1987). If there are oversubscribed issues in the 
market, the large and reputable will take the priority to receive these shares as 
rewards in the form of abnormal returns. Moreover, Bandwagon effects proposed by 
Welch (1992), it is implied from this hypothesis that the investors not only consider 
their own information, they will also be affected by the purchasing decisions of 
other investors. Namely, although the favorable information possessed by an 
investor, he will never buy any share if no other people have an interest in these 
shares under this theory. Therefore, the shares needed to be underpriced to attract 
the first few investors and then to appeal the other subsequent investors who are 
observing their competitors¶ reaction to certain issues.  
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There is also a notion known as avoiding the lawsuits that has been investigated by 
a group of scholars.  For instance, According to Ritter (2003), the fear of lawsuit 
can be regarded as one explanation for the high degree of underpricing for the 
internet IPOs. Besides, Tinic (1988) indicates that IPO underpricing is an issuance 
premium utilized by issuers and underwriters to avert lawsuits. 
 
Table 1ü the evidence of IPO underpricing around the world 
Scholars  Nation NO. Sample 
period 
Level of 
underpricing 
(%) 
Lee,Taylor and Walter 
Aggarwal,Leal,Hernandez (1993) 
Su and Fleisher (1999) 
Clarkson and Merkley (1994) 
Ljungqvist (1997) 
Aggarwal et al. (1993) 
Paudyal, Sadouni, Briston (1998) 
Firth (1997) 
Levis (1993) 
Ritter (1991) 
Australia  
Brazil  
China  
Canada  
Germany 
Mexico 
Malaysia 
New Zealand 
UK 
US 
266 
62 
308 
180 
189 
37 
95 
143 
712 
1183 
1976-1989 
1979-1990 
1987-1995 
1984-1987 
1987-1991 
1987-1990 
1995 
1979-1987 
1980-1988 
1975-1985 
11.90 
78.50 
948.50 
6.44 
10.57 
33.00 
62.10 
25.90 
14.30 
11.00 
Resource: Su, D. (2004) ³$GYHUVH-Selection versus Signaling: Evidence from the Pricing of 
Chinese ,32V´   Journal of Economics and Business 56 (1), 1±19. 
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This segment will then present the empirical findings and results of the above 
investigation on IPO underpricing. Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975) ever discovered that 
high short-term monthly abnormal returns are provided by their sample IPOs. 
Aggarwal and Rivoli (1990) find that the investments on IPOs are quite 
remunerative in the short-run while things may become complicated and 
underperformed in the long-run. It is also revealed from their studies that IPO 
underpricing is partially due to the overvaluation in the secondary market. The 
underpricing of IPO is just a short-term phenomenon according to Ritter (1991).  
Furthermore, the research of Chan, Wei and Wang (2004) displays that the level of 
underpricing in non-OECD nations is around 65.9% which is much more higher than 
11.1% in the OECD countries. 
 
2.2 The Empirical Studies on IPO Underpricing in Asia Market 
 
There are a few studies and literatures focus on the IPO underpricing in Asian 
markets, but this subsection will mainly discuss the situations in Japan, Singapore 
and HongKong. The common feature of all the Asian markets is that they have a 
quite high level of underpricing comparing to the western countries. This discovery 
affirm the notion of Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist (1994) who suggest that the 
extent of IPO underpricing in developing countries is more severe than that in 
developed nations. To be specific, the average level of IPO underpricing is 256.9% 
for China; 104.1% for Malaysia; 74.3% for Korea; 46 .7% for Thailand, 35.3 % for 
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India, 31.4% for Singapore, 28.4% for Japan, 15.9% for Hong Kong, 15.1% for 
Indonesia (Ritter, 2003). 
 
Pettway and Kaneko (1996) studies 147 IPOs traded on the Tokyo stock exchange 
between 1981 and 1993 and find that the value of initial return will decrease 
considerably when the pricing method depends on market price and executive 
direction. The investors are thus entitled to get access to the IPO shares and an 
auction is conducted before the setting of issue price. Such consequences are 
coincided with the standpoint that the extent of underpricing can be sufficiently 
decreased by the changes in the public policy.  
 
Certain allocation and application mechanism are applied by Lee, Taylor, and Walter 
(1999) as an explanation of IPOs underpricing in Singapore. By acquiring a sample 
of 91 IPOs between 1973 and 1992, the gains and losses made by investor of 
different size are studied. The consequences are supportive of the speculations of 
WKHZLQQHU¶VFXUVHWKHRU\VLQFHLWSURYLGHVWKHHYLGHQFHWKDWLQYHstors of larger size 
are essentially more informative than the smaller ones. Such an information 
dominance is substantially embodied in their superior IPO application strategies. 
The large-sized investors usually earn profits from the underpriced shares although 
there may also a loss for them in the overpriced issues. They exceed the small 
investors by owning majority of the most underpring shares and leaving those 
unattractive and less profitable issues to small investors. In addition, various 
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signaling models are innovated by Firth and Liau-Tan (1997) to value the 
unseasoned new shares during the period 1980 to 1993 offered by Singapore stock 
H[FKDQJH 7KHVH PRGHOV DGRSWHG ILQDQFLDO DGYLVHUV¶ UHSXWDWLRQ DQG PDQDJHUV¶
reserved ownership as signals to investLJDWH WKH SURFHGXUHV RI QHZ LVVXHV¶
valuation. Moreover, different pricing methods are tried by Hameed and Lim (1998) 
to test their influence on the underpricing phenomenon at Singapore stock market, 
they find the utilization of tender option bonds as the symbol of firms with 
distinguished quality. Concerning the Hong Kong stock exchange, a notable 
investigation of 92 IPOs within a decade (between 1980 and 1990) indicates that 
majority of post-listing returns can be obtained at the end of the first trading day 
(McGuinness, 1992).  
 
2.3 Previous empirical studies on Chinese IPO underpricing  
 
Table 2² The investigations on the underpricing of Chinese IPOs 
Investigator           sample size sample period underpricing(%)   
Mok and Hui (1998) 101 1990²1993 289.2 
Su and Fleisher (1999) 308 1987²1995 948.6 
Liu (2003) 354 1999²2002 135.0 
Su (2004) 587 1994²1999 128.2 
Chan et al. (2004) 570 1995²1998 178.0 
Chi and Padgett (2005) 668 1996²2000 129.2 
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Kimbro (2005) 691 1995²2002 132.0 
Wang (2005) 747 1994²1999 271.9 
Li (2006) 314 1999²2001 134.6 
Resource: Su, D.(2004) µAdverse-Selection Versus Signaling: Evidence from the pricing of 
Chinese IPOs.¶ Journal of economics and business 56(1) 1±19. 
There are also numerous studies on the Chinese IPO market although they are 
limited since the stock market in China is comparatively new. These studies with 
their implications and explanations will be succinctly discussed in this section. As 
shown from table1, almost all the previous studies indicate a huge degree of 
underpring as measured by the initial return of A-share IPOs in China. This large 
percentage of underpring can be explained by Chen, Firth and Kim (2000) as the 
lack of experience of the issuers, investors and the long time lag between issuing 
and listing date. Additionally, the demand of new issues and seasoned equity issues 
may also contribute to the underpricing of the current IPOs. Mok and Hui (1998) 
also discover that the high level of underpricing is mainly the consequence of the 
continuously extra demand for the limited amount of tradable shares. This notion 
happens to be consistent with discovery of Chi and Padgett (2005) who indicates 
that the official interposition has a significant effect on underpricing. The state 
utilizes an incomplete quota system to determine the allocation of issued shares 
ZKLFKKDVFDXVHGWKHGLVHTXLOLEULXPRIVKDUHV¶GHPDQGDQGVXSSO\0HDQZKLOH
Instead of informing the participants in the market about the quality of issuers and 
firms, the official party in China just captures the available market opportunities to 
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earn high profits by separating the shares into the hot issue period, thus majority of 
participants in the Chinese stock market are less informed with less investing 
experience. Therefore, the underpricing of IPOs can be interpreted by both the high 
requirements aroused by this quota mechanism, but also by the relatively high 
percentage of uninformed investors and purchasers of the issued IPOs which 
sustains the information asymmetry hypothesis. Chan, Wei, and Wang (2004) also 
finds a positive relationship between IPO underpricing and this quota system used 
to allocate the new offerings. Furthermore, as demonstrated by Kimbro (2005), it is 
common for the issuers of new stock in china to underestimate and understate the 
benefits and revenues in their financial prospectus which will thereby leading to the 
IPO underpricing. From the viewpoint of Su and Fleisher (1999) who concentrate on 
the signaling model and attempt to use this model as explanations for IPO 
underpricing in China. They recommended a positive correlation between IPO 
XQGHUSULFLQJDQGWKH ILUP¶V LQWULQVLFYDOXH LVVXHUV¶SURSULHWRUVKLS+RZHYHU WKH
underpricing has a negative relationship with the proceeds which is the initial issue 
price for the proportion of tradable shares in the market. The issuers with high 
degree of initial return tend to raise more funds than those with lower degree of IPO 
underpricing. Briefly, they concluded that underpricing of IPOs is a strategy for 
firms to signal their value to potential investors. While Li () declares that the 
underpricing of IPOs is adversely related to the firm-specific factors such as the 
lottery rate used by companies, the size, price and year of issuance. Su (2004) 
claims that the underpricing of A-share IPOs are in strict conformity to certain 
14 
SUHYLRXV VWXGLHV OLNH VLJQDOOLQJ PRGHO DQG ZLQQHU¶V FXUVH K\SRWKHVLV 7KH
consequences of his research is similar to that of Li () by claiming the impact of 
firm-specific elements on the level of IPO underpricing. Specifically, these factors 
consist of the issuing size and practice, insider and firm ownership as well as the 
system for allocation, with the ownership positively related to the underpricing 
while offering size adversely related to it. The level of initial return will be higher 
than normal when a lottery mechanism is adopted to distribute shares. Excepting 
the above, Yu and Tse (2006) concentrate on the study of tKHZLQQHU¶VFXUVHPRGHO
signaling model as well as the ex ante uncertainty hypothesis and they concluded 
WKDWWKHZLQQHU¶VFXUVHPRGHOLVTXLWHSURSHUWRH[SODLQWKHXQGHUSULFLQJRI,32s in 
china.  
 
3. Unique characteristics of Chinese institutions 
 
As studied by Su and Fleisher (1998), the Chinese stock market has a series of 
unique institutional features since its establishment in 1990s. Initially, the Chinese 
government has a strict control over the shares of the state-owned companies to 
preserve the current structure of economy. It essentially imposed strict rules on the 
provision of IPOs as well as the setting of their offering prices. The central 
government usually holds more than two thirds of shares when state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) come to market and none of these shares are tradable before 
2005. There are mainly five types of shares in the Chinese IPO stock market, all of 
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which have the same cash-flow and voting rights. The tradable shares are classified 
as domestic (A) and foreign shares (B, H and N) in accordance with the investors¶ 
different nationality. A-shares are only tradable within the Chinese market like 
shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchange for domestic residents and are thus 
denominated in RMB. While B-shares are denominated in foreign currencies and 
they were once only tradable in the overseas market, however, these shares are 
also available to the domestic investors since March 2001. An auction mechanism 
or the firm-committed underwriters are adopted to sell these two categories of 
shares to the potential investors. H-shares are currently traded on the Hong Kong 
security market and N-shares are exchanged in the form of American depository 
receipts on the U.S. stock market. The other three types of offerings are sold at 
shares¶ par value which is the firms¶ total assets divided by gross number of shares 
listed on the prospectus. They are known as government shares, legal entity shares 
and employee shares that are held by state assets management bureau, the 
official-owned companies, managers and employees respectively. Such type of 
shares are untradeable in both shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchange (Chan, 
Wang and Wei, 2002).  
 
In the second place, as indicated by Mok and Hui (1998), the Chinese authorities 
control and set rules for the IPO process and claims several issues such as how to 
determine the issue price, which industrial sectors should be the beneficiaries of 
equity financing. Such decisions are made on the basis of the strategic focus of the 
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state. There is a specific quota system for IPOs which is set by the state council and 
is distributed to different ministers and provincial governments by the CSRS. This 
quota are not allowed to trade in the market and those sectors and industries 
outside of the state¶s strategic focus will definitely not included in the program. 
Such a quota was repealed in the middle of 1999 and then the investment banks 
were authorized to be responsible for recognizing and developing the listed 
candidates. The main obligation of china securities regulatory commission was 
thereby ensuring that issuers and investors fully comply with the laws and 
regulations within the stock market. In China, the CSRC plays a similar role as the 
securities exchange commission plays in the U.S. stock market since it manages 
and authorizes all the IPOs in China. The approval and authorization is made on the 
basis of a series of criteria including market conditions, the development conditions 
of different industries, the financial performance and specific features of certain 
enterprises, besides the regional and geographical characteristics have also been 
taken into consideration. According to Sherman and Titman (2002), in the U.S., it 
is usually the inYHVWPHQWEDQNµVUHVSRQVLELOLW\ to decide the offer price and allocate 
initial shares through a discretionary book building process. Unlike this strategy, 
the offer price for Chinese IPOs depend on a preset P/E formula developed by CSRC 
which also restricts IPOs in allocation quantity and offer price according to different 
industries and regions. The P/E ratio was ever set as 15 between 1991 and 1998, it 
was then raised to 20 by CSRC when determining the offer price for new IPOs from 
1999. Consequently, the average return is considerably different in these two 
17 
SHULRGVZKLFKGHPRQVWUDWHV WKHJRYHUQPHQW¶V LPSDFWRQ LQLWLDOSULFLQJRI ,32V
Furthermore, even within the same time period, the P/E ratio approach has caused 
more severe underpricing to those companies with lower risk as they are offered 
higher price comparing to the firms with higher risk. Even though a new verification 
system has been applied since 2001, the P/E ratio method still remains as the 
primary and dominant approach for the investment bankers when pricing IPOs and 
the timing of these shares are also controlled by the CSRC.  
 
Additionally, an administrative approach was used to decide IPO issue price in the 
early development stages of the Chinese stock market with the intention to avert 
the over-optimistic estimated earnings by the investors with excessive optimism. 
The concrete method was to set the issue price by applying a formula that 
multiplied a predetermined P/E ratio which was claimed by the CSRC to the average 
of the firm¶s earnings in past three years. However, there are several drawbacks 
with this approach. For instance, the implemented P/E ratio presumes all 
companies to be equal but actually they are not. Additionally, there was a great 
difference between the pre-set and market P/E ratio since the market was usually 
trading with a P/E ratio of 50 while the pre-set P/E ratio was between 13 and 15 
(Chen, Firth and Kim, 2004). It is impossible for investment banks to provide 
companies with a high P/E ratio with such an enormous demand for IPOs. With the 
promulgation of the security law in 1999, the Chinese stock market became more 
market-oriented as a new pricing method had been adopted by CSRC. The issuers 
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and underwriters are allowed to set the preliminary offering price while the 
institutional investors who were desired to be the owners of these shares were 
entitled to determine the final offering prices.  
 
In the next developing stage, a policy aiming to decrease the state-owned shares 
was introduced by the Chinese government in 2001. The supply of shares was 
substantially increased by this policy and the sock prices are thereby reducing 
dramatically. As a consequence, the IPO prices of multitudinous enterprises went 
down below its issue price and this aroused a common query about the usefulness 
and effectiveness of such a policy. Under this condition, the Chinese government 
stated that the IPO offering price should reuse a specific P/E ratio which is known as 
the controlled P/E ratio method as based on the P/E multiplier. This method 
resembles the original P/E ratio but with the multiplier being set less than twenty, 
enabling the final offering price to be ten percent higher or lower than the 
preliminary offering price. while in contemporary society, the pricing procedures of 
IPOs do not require the official approval any more after the modification of the firm 
and security laws in 2004. Thereafter, instead of receiving the official approval for 
the IPO offering price, the issuers inquired certain investors to determine a 
preliminary price range and the ultimate offering price are then decided by the 
market demand. Therefore, the degree of IPO underpricing was found to be lower 
than ever. (Tian and Megginson, 2007) 
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Furthermore, the average number of days between the IPO announcement date 
when the IPOs¶ issue prices are set and the date when shares are traded on the 
market is another distinguished characteristics of Chinese IPOs since this time 
duration is quite long in China comparing to the other developed countries. It is 260 
and 72 calendar days for A-share and B-share separately, which is relatively higher 
than majority of other nations (Firth and Kim, 2004). According to the research of 
Loughran et (1994), this specific time elapse is only one day for the U.S., fortnight 
for Japan, four weeks for Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan, and two-month for 
Thailand.  
 
Moreover, the IPO allocation system in China is another feature distinguish it from 
other countries with a series of evolutions. Before the 20th century, a pure lottery 
sustains as the preferred method for allocating IPOs in Chinese stock market and its 
development has gone through a series of steps from 1992 to 1994. A lottery 
mechanism with settled pre-set number of forms exists in 1992. Meanwhile, the 
amount of lottery forms that can be accessed by the potential purchasers are also 
stationary at that moment. The probability to be the winner in this lottery system 
can be known ahead of schedule since the number of forms a winner could buy is 
also fixed (Su and Fleisher, 1999). Two new lottery systems are introduced before 
long in 1993, with the first one allows central bank to sell a certain quantity of 
lottery forms to investors as they desire to buy. There is no limitation on the 
numbers of lottery forms that could be sold this time, therefore the possibility of 
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beating the lottery is an uncharted territory to buyers. The second category of 
lottery system requires investors to create a peculiar saving account with lower 
interest rate and deposit certain amount of capitals in it when they apply for the 
new offerings. The funds are not allowed to be withdrawn until the final 
accomplishment date of the lottery. Then in the next year, an auction system and a 
fixed price issuance showed up in succession. In the former system, issuers 
determine the initial price and quantity for the shares to issue and let the 
underlying investor bid for it. The final bid price will balance the supply and demand. 
These existing lottery mechanisms allow companies and issuers to select between 
various allocation methods and majority of lottery funds are raised by the 
stated-owned banks whose responsibility are accredit to sell shares for enterprises 
to the latent investors. (Guo and Brooks, 2008) 
 
Then in the latter periods, as stated by Chi and Padgett (2005), instead of allocating 
IPO shares by a book building strategy as the other mature market does, a quota 
scheme was subsequently followed by the IPO issuers to allow an unrestrained 
number of application forms that are available for the lottery winners. Ultimately, 
another outstanding peculiarity of Chinese stock market is that the new-issued 
shares demonstrate merely a small percentage of eminent shares and the great 
majority of shares are still possessed by the government and legal entities. This 
phenomenon implies that if the government and legal entities¶ ownership is high, 
the amount of share available to the public investors will be restricted and the initial 
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return in the first trading day will be higher. Besides, this high proportion of 
government and legal entities¶ retention is usually accompanied with low efficiency 
and productivity which will reduce the potential investors¶ enthusiasm and interest 
on these offerings and thus lead to a relatively lower initial return for IPOs in the 
first trading day. 
 
4. Methodology and theoretical framework 
 
4.1 Implication from Information asymmetry and uncertainty  
 
As indicated by Myers and Majluf (1984), share managers usually have information 
superiority against the potential investors and these shares will thus provide 
adverse information to investors. These managers have to underprice IPOs in this 
circumstance so as to attract more investors as the government encourages them 
to participate into the IPO issuing and purchasing activities. From 2000, the 
national government takes the responsibility for policy formulation to assist the 
CSRC to price the new issued IPOs. The main investors in China are individuals and 
the government has to possess certain amount of shares so as to suit the national 
conditions of China as a socialized country. Consequently, the major market 
participators of the IPO event can be divided into two groups, the individual 
investors with limited investment skills and they are normally less informative 
about the true quality of the quality of the offering firms. The other party is the 
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state-owned companies who are struggling to successfully attract more underlying 
investors by underpricing the IPOs. An adequate amount of money will be earned in 
this way to further stimulate the prosperous development of the IPO market. 
Therefore, an assumption concerning the relationship between the quantity of 
state-owned enterprises and the IPOs underpricing emerges.  
 
The relatively high government and legal entities ownership has an influence on the 
offering and underpricing of IPO due to its vast portions on dividends allocation and 
the rights of voting. Mok and Hui (1998) state that in a market with the existence 
of information asymmetry, the high proportion of the state-owned equity and 
VKDUHV FDQEH WUHDWHGDV DQ LQGLFDWRU RI FRPSDQLHV¶ TXDOLW\1amely, the large 
government and legal entities¶ ownership of offerings indicates a small extent of ex 
ante uncertainty and hence result in a low level of IPO underpricing. This high 
government ownship also gives confidence to investors as it provides a guarantee 
for the volatility of IPOs.  They thus contend a negative relationship between the 
government ownship and the level of IPO underpricing. Similarly, Chi and Padgett 
(2005) discovers the same inverse correlation between government, legal entity 
ownership and the IPO initial return. However, Chen et al (2004) claims that there 
is a positive relationship between the state ownership and the initial return. To test 
this, the proportion of shares possessed by the government, legal entities and the 
state-owned firms at the offering date is used as an independent variable in this 
paper. If this percentage is high, the shares that can be sold to the investors will be 
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astricted, the underpeicing of IPOs will thus be lower.  
Hypothesis one: 
H0: A negative relationship is expected between the percentage of state-owned 
shares and the initial returns on IPOs. 
H1: there is not a relationship between the percentage of state-owned shares and 
the initial returns on IPOs. 
 
According to Beatty and Ritter (1986), another factor that will have a direct 
influence on the initial return of IPOs is the offer size of the company which is a 
proxy for the risk and uncertainty of the IPO issuing firms, it is equal to the number 
of shares issued multiplied by their offer price. They emphasizes that the 
SURVSHFWLYH,32XQGHUSULFLQJLVDIXQFWLRQUHJDUGLQJWRWKHXQFHUWDLQW\RIWKH,32V¶
market price, namely, the risk of the larger companies is relatively lower than that 
of the small ones which will in return receive higher initial returns. Additionally, the 
offering size is quite appropriate to test the market performance and the IPO 
underpricing in the Chinese stock market since its unsound management system 
with the popularity of insider exchanging and price manipulation. In this condition, 
the issuing size has a straightforward impact on the price adjustment processes 
and the level of speculative trade of certain stocks. The larger the size of offering 
and floating, the more complicated it is for the investors to regulate the share price, 
and the less riskier the stocks will be. Therefore,  a negative relationship between 
the market value of the offering size and the initial returns is expected.  
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Hypothesis two: 
H0: there is an adverse relationship between the offering size and the underpricing 
of IPOs. 
H1: the firms¶ offer size has no impact on the initial returns of IPOs. 
 
Furthermore, a dummy variable can be added as another proxy for the uncertainty 
of listed firms, that is whether or not the high-tech products defined by the science 
and technology ministry are contained in the production range of these 
corporations. Although the development potentials and opportunities may be 
provided by the high-tech products, they are also more risky and contain more 
uncertainty. Hence, they will generally obtain higher level of IPO underpricing in 
contrast to enterprises with traditional and conservative productions. 
Hypothesis three: 
H0: The relationship between firms with high-tech products and initial returns on 
IPOs are anticipated to be positive. 
H1: Firms in the high-tech industries have no direct impact on the level of 
underpricing in Chinese stock market. 
 
Meanwhile, Ritter (1991), Megginson and Weiss (1991) finds that the age of the 
firm from its establishment to the time of offering can also be used to measure the 
H[ DQWH XQFHUWDLQW\ RI ,32V 7KH QDWXUDO ORJDULWKP RI WKH FRPSDQLHV¶ DJH LV
therefore adopted here as a control variable for the IPO underpricing.  
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Hypothesis four: 
Ha : The age of the firm is inversely related to IPO underpricing. 
Hb : there is no relation between the age of the firm and IPO underpricing. 
 
Another dependent variable uses to explain the underpricing of A-share IPOs is the 
time elapsed between the IPO issuing date and the first day of market trading since 
numerous empirical studies have found a positive correlation between this time 
duration and the underpricing of IPOs. In the Chinese market, this positive 
relationship also exists according to the recoveries of Chen et al.(2004)and Mok 
and Hui (1998). Besides, this time duration between IPO prospectus and listing 
date in China is much longer than that in other developed nations (Su and Fleisher, 
1999). As shown from Chen et al. (2004), the average level of IPO underpricing is 
around 298% on the basis of the whole database with the time elapse 
approximately equals to 90 days. The average underpricing degree for the 
subgroup data with time elapse period less than two months is lower than the 
normal level and stabilize at 110% while for those durations longer than two 
months, the average level rapidly increased to 630%. This phenomenon is 
described by Chen et al. (2004) as a rationale that the long time duration will 
considerably increase the risk of issuing shares. Consequently, it is required by the 
issuers to underprice their new offerings so as to compensate for this emerging risk. 
This explaination is similar to the conclusions of Mok and Hui (1998) who claims 
that the underpricing of IPOs to a large extent is necessary not only because the 
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existence of information asymmetry among issuers, investors and underwriters in 
the Chinese stock exchange, but also based on the condition that the larger time 
duration will increase the level of risk for issuers and firms. To test this hypothesis, 
the natural logarithm of the time period between IPO issuing and listing is adopted 
as expressed by LnTIMEIPO. 
Hypothesis five:  
H0: a positive relationship is expected between the time elapse and the IPO 
underpricing. 
H1: time lag between IPO prospectus and listing day has no influence on IPO 
underpricing. 
. 
4.2 Implications and Variables Derived from Signalling Model 
 
The signaling model is based on the investigations of Allen and Faulhaber (1989), 
Grinblatt and Hwang (1989). All of which had raised various signaling models in 
terms of the underpricing of initial public offerings. In these models, the issuers are 
assumed to be more informative about the quality and intrinsic value of IPO 
offering companies than the potential investors. They claims that the high-quality 
firms tend to differentiate themselves from the low-quality ones by launch a 
considerable amount of expenses which the bad companies cannot afford. This 
huge expenditure is known as the IPO underpricing. Thus signaling is an indicator of 
the firm quality. The value of the companies can be maximized by underpricing the 
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IPOs so as to let the succedent seasoned equity offerings being offered at a 
SURILWDEOHSULFH,WDOORZVWKHSXUFKDVHUVRIVKDUHVWRGLVWLQJXLVKEHWZHHQWKH³JRRG´
and ³EDG´ companies. Generally, companies and issuers with low value do not have 
the intention to underprice their shares since they are not aim to improve their 
value through the issuance of the subsequent SEOs. Instead these low-value 
issuers usually prefer to take what they have earned and withdraw from the IPO 
event. According to the framework of Allen and Faulhaber (1989), investors 
commonly renovate their preliminary knowledge about the firm value through the 
estimation of its earnings or dividend policy, with High earnings promote the status 
of the companies and vice versa. The high after-market earnings are efficacious for 
firms with high level of underpricing to renew their previous information and beliefs 
concerning the firm value. To summarize form this model, the companies with high 
earnings are normally have a high level of underpricing. They also have a rather 
high payout ratio and set the dividends much earlier than their competitors, and 
they are prepared to have a quick and favorable reaction to the dividend 
proclamation in the stock market.  
 
There are mainly two empirical implications from the signaling model will be 
discussed in this paper. The first one is the inverse relationship between the IPO 
offering price and its underpricing. As demonstrated by Grinblatt and Hwang 
(1989), this IPO price refers to the amount of money obtained by the companies 
from the portion of shares provided to the outside investors. It is also named IPO 
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proceeds and is represented by funds and capitals raised by the A-share IPOs from 
2000 to 2004. This variable is represented by IPOVALUE. Additionally, the value of 
certain project and issue event can be estimated since this value can be 
conjectured from the proportion of shares retained by the issuers. The higher the 
percentage of shares listed by the issuers, the better the quality of the underlying 
project. Similarly, it is possible for the investors to speculate the value of issuers 
with the lowest risk by analyzing the relative size of their IPOs. Hence, the level of 
underpricing can also be recognized for any issuers provided that the offering size 
and price of IPOs are available.  As Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) states if the 
proportions of shares owned by firms are hold constant, then the offering price at 
which the issue is being sold and the degree of IPO underpricing is expected to be 
negatively correlated.  
Hypothesis six:  
H0: the funds and capitals raised by IPOs has a negative impact on the level of IPO 
underpricing.  
H1: IPO value should not be used as an explanatory factor for IPO underpricing. 
 
The other implication is also derived from the research of Allen and Faulhaber (1989) 
DVWKH\UHJDUGWKHFRPSDQLHV¶EHKDYLRUVRIXQGHUSULFHWKHLUQHZLVVXHVDVDVLJQDO
of firm quality. Therefore, a variable named earnings per share (EPS) is contained 
in this study to measure the after-market performance and quality of IPO issuing 
enterprises. This dependent variable shows the earning per share of the IPO 
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companies during the last three years before the listing date.  
Hypothesis seven:  
H0: a positive coefficient is expected for the earnings per share.  
H1: earnings per share have no descriptive power for the level of IPO underpricing. 
 
4.3 Implications from the Theory of Imbalance Between IPO Supply and 
Demand 
 
Lottery rate and turnover ratio are employed in this paper to indicate to what extent 
IPOs are required based on the fact that inequality between the supply and demand 
of IPOs exists in China stock market with the demand for new issues largely exceed 
their supply. As investigated by Hanley and Wilhem (1998) by using the portion of 
shares provided by certain stockholders, there is a significant positive relationship 
between IPO requirements and their degree of underpricing.  The odds of winning 
the lottery is ever studied by Chi and Padgett (2005), they find a negative 
relationship between this ratio and the level of underpricing, which is the same as 
the consequences concluded by Liu and Li (2000). They also regarded this ratio as 
a method to measure the level of imbalance between supply and demand during 
the period prior to IPO issuing date. The tradable A-shares in china are generally 
distributed through a lottery system, with the lottery winners being chosen 
stochastically and are allowed to become the potential owners of shares. However, 
only a small amount of investors and share purchasers can be the winners of the 
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lottery due to the commonly serious imbalance in Chinese stock market. The lottery 
rate is computed as a ratio of successful subscribers on the total number of legally 
valid subscribers which reflects the extent of underlying investors¶ interest and 
aspiration for a specific offering. For instance, a high value of this ratio reflects a low 
demand for IPOs and a low level of underpricing is thereby being expected.  
 
Furthermore, the alternative control variable is the turnover rate as a proxy for the 
trading frequency of stocks on the first trading day. It is calculated by dividing the 
trading volume on the first trading day by the number of tradable A-shares. This 
ratio is also a reflection of the disequilibrium of supply and demand when the shares 
have been listed on the stock exchange (Chau, Ciccotello and Grant, 1999).  The 
large quantity of stocks being traded on the first listing day demonstrates a high 
interest and requirement investors have for specific IPOs. Therefore, a high winning 
lottery and a low turnover rate is speculated to be consistent with a low value of IPO 
initial return. 
 
Hypothesis eight: the IPO initial returns are negatively related to lottery rate while 
positively related to the turnover ratio. 
 
4.4 Other Relative Factors for Explaining the Underpricing of Chinese IPOs 
 
Apart from the explanatory variables discussed above, other dependent variables 
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like leverage, underwriter reputation, registered capital of IPO issuing firms and the 
number of employees they have at that moment will also be included in this study. 
The leverage of firms is simply the debt to assets ratio will also be included in the 
OLS regression model to test their impact on the underpricing of IPO in Chinese 
stock market. A series of capital structure signaling models have shown that 
leverage conveys information to the market according to Harris and Raviv (1990), 
Nachman and Noe (1994). They argue that a huge amount of debt financing will be 
used by issuers when they realize that they are more informative concerning the 
quality and profitable opportunities than the outsiders. The more debt a company 
owns, the higher leveraged the company is and this high level of leverage is in turn 
a symbol of the high financial distress with Chinese firms. In this paper, the value of 
OHYHUDJHLVGHILQHGDVWKHSDUYDOXHRIILUP¶VGHEWGLYLGHGE\WKHSDUYDOue of its 
total assets.  
 
The impact of underwriters¶ reputation has not been considered until 2002 due to 
the incomplete data in the earlier time period. The underwriter reputation is 
selected as an explanatory due to its significance on the level of underpricing. As 
claimed by Sherman and Titman (2002), the discretion of underwriter is of great 
significance to the promotion of companies¶ benefits. A distinguished underwriter is 
more capable of reckoning the gross market demand for offerings, evaluating the 
new-issued shares and setting a quite profitable offer price for the issuers to collect 
afterwards. Moreover, underwriters are not only responsible for the determination 
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of the final issue price, they are also entitled to set price ranges for the new 
offerings in the prospectus. A relatively lower offer price will be advised by the 
underwriters when they have earned sufficient profits from both the issuers and 
investors. Conversely, underwriters can only be compensated by the overall 
spreads from issuers (Guo and Brooks, 2008). A series of previous studies have 
concentrated on the impact of underwriter reputation on the underpring of IPOs 
and majority of them have found a negative correlation between them. For instance, 
a tombstone announcement is utilized by Carter (1998) by investigate the USA 
database. He  However, Owing to the specific features of Chinese stock market, 
the most quoted and popular method for measuring underwriter reputation as 
innovated by Carter and Manaster (1990) will not used here since it adopts the 
well-known tombstone announcement which are not used and inappropriate in the 
Chinese stock exchange. Instead, a new measurement substitutes the underwriter 
reputation as a ratio of the gross proceeds raised by the underwriters to the whole 
profits collected in the market during the sample period. If two or more 
underwriters jointly administrate the total proceeds of IPO, this proceeds will be 
equally split and allocated to each of them (Su and Bangassa, 2011). They also 
state that the more number of IPOs managed by an underwriter, the better it is 
known to the public and the higher its reputation. Thus the quantity of IPOs 
managed by each underwriter can be treated as an alternative ranking variable for 
the underwriter reputation. However, merely the former method is adopted here 
due to data loss. Hypothesis nine:  
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H0: there is an inverse correlation between the underwriter reputation and the 
initial returns of IPOs. 
H1: underwriter reputation has no effect on the level of IPO underpricing. 
 
5. Data Description and Empirical Results 
  
The ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model which is estimated by using 
white test for heteroskedasticity standard errors is adopted in this paper to analyze 
the IPO underpricing in the Chinese stock market. Meanwhile this paper obtains 
and analyzes data on all the tradable A-shares in both Shenzhen and Shanghai 
stock exchange within five years on the basis of china stock IPO research database 
which was exploited by Shenzhen GTA (Guo Tai an) information technology, Limited. 
As designated exclusively for the foreign investors, B- shares are not included in my 
study since their less volatility in comparison with the A-shares offered exclusively 
to domestic citizens.  
 
The entire sample data in this paper is comprised of 293 IPOs in Chinese security 
exchange from January 2000 to September 2004. Meanwhile a sub-period data 
from 2002 to 2004 is also being investigated with the involvement of two 
measurements of underwriter reputation. The sample time period is determined as 
from 2000 to 2004 due to the specific features of the chosen control variables and 
two reforms about Chinese stock exchange in 2005 and 2006 respectively. Apart 
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from the stocks owned by the state and legal entities, there are still other 
categories of shares like employee shares, common public shares which occupy 
approximately two thirds of the gross listed shares in China. Such type of shares 
can only be transferred to others through private treaty instead of being tradable in 
Shanghai and Shenzhen security exchange. This situation has not been changed 
until the stock market reform in 2006 which adopted a more flexible policy for the 
tradable shares so as to attract more investors. Additionally, there is also a policy 
reform in 2005 after which the government ownership are theoretically cancelled 
and thus the Chinese stock exchange become more flexible and market-oriented. 
The sample data used here is from January 2002 to September 2004 since the 
government retention does not exist from then on. The prime control variables with 
their implication and expected coefficients are listed in Table 3. 
 
Table 3 key variables used in the OLS regression models 
Name of the control 
variables 
Expected 
coefficient 
Implication and description 
government & legal entity 
ownership 
 
 
logarithm of IPO offer size 
 
Negative 
 
 
 
Negative 
 
The proportion of shares owned 
by government and legal entities/ 
total shares outstanding in the 
market 
The number of offering shares * 
the offering price 
35 
logarithm of firm age 
 
 
logarithm of time lag 
 
logarithm of IPO value 
 
earnings per share 
 
leverage 
 
turnover ratio 
 
lottery rate 
 
no. of employees at the 
time of offering 
 
logarithm of the registered  
capital at the time of 
offering 
 
Negative 
 
 
Positive 
 
Negative 
 
Positive 
 
positive 
 
Positive 
 
Negative 
 
No clear 
expectation 
 
No clear 
expectation 
 
 
The logarithm of the number of 
days between the firms¶ IPO 
listing and establishment.  
The time lag between issuing and 
offering of IPOs. 
The earnings per share of the 
issuer in the year of IPO listing. 
Earnings per share of issuer in the 
year of listing. A proxy for the 
signaling model. 
Total debts / total assets 
Trading frequency of certain 
shares on their first trading day. 
The ratio of successful subscribers 
on the entire no. of subscribers. 
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underwriter reputation 
 
 
 
 
 
dummy1: high-tech 
 
 
dummy2: IPO listing 
location 
 
 
Negative 
 
 
 
 
 
positive 
 
 
Positive 
 
 
a. The gross proceeds raised by 
the underwriters / total 
proceeds raised in the market 
b. Number of offerings managed 
and subscribe by the 
underwriter. 
Equal to 1 if firms¶ business scope 
contains high-tech products and 0 
otherwise 
Equal to 1 if the new-issued 
shares belong to shanghai stock 
exchange and 0 otherwise 
 
5.1 Definition and measurement of IPO underpricing 
 
There are mainly two definitions of IPO underpricing. One is followed by Ritter and 
Welch (1986) as the proportion by which the closing price in the first trading day 
exceeds the issue price. The alternative one is employed by Amihud, Hauser and 
Kirth (2003), it is the percentage the initial return outstrip the market return. The 
latter one is adopted in this research due to its relatively high practicability.  
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The first trading day initial return (1st RET or IR) is computed as a proxy of IPO 
underpricing for each firm: 
 
1st RET= 
୐ ୓ൗ െ ୐ ଴ൗ  
 
Where 1st RET represents for underpricing, P0 is the issue price and ୐ is the stock 
SULFHDWWKHHQGRIWKHILUVWGD\¶VWUDGLQJLQWKHPDUNHW,l is the market index for 
Shenzhen or shanghai stock exchange at the end of the first day of trading of 
certain IPOs issued in the sample data and I0 is the stock exchange index at the 
offer date. 
 
5.2 Basic Econometric summarization of data  
 
This following section will be divided into three parts, with the first part describes 
the basic summarized statistics like the mean, maximum and minimum value of the 
control variables as well as their standard deviation. The skewness and kurtosis for 
each of the independent variable can be found in appendix two. In the second 
sub-section, a correlation analysis based on both the dependent and independent 
variables will be discussed. 
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Table 4 basic descriptive statistics for variables used 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
IR 301 0.8514 0.4095 -1.1440 1.2042 
Govret 301 0.4345 0.2784 0.0008 1 
Lnoffsize 301 19.8283 0.7605 17.1345 23.1927 
Lnage 299 7.0502 0.6562 5.4806 8.4013 
Lnipot 299 2.7644 1.0653 0 8.1158 
Lnipova 301 19.9436 0.6218 18.3255 22.2091 
EPS 299 1.3409 2.1264 -0.0827 33 
Lev 301 0.5528 0.1622 0 0.9642 
Turnover 301 0.5878 0.1135 0.23 0.88 
Lottery 298 0.3599 0.7264 0.0262 6.7597 
Noemplee 296 3640.419 29604.85 48 508168 
Lncapit 299 19.0017 0.9628 17.7275 25.1857 
Hightech 301 0.1229 0.3289 0 1 
Exg 301 0.7807 0.4144 0 1 
UW 112 1.1534 2.5763 0 21.3689 
 
According to table four, a sample of 293 A-share IPOs representing a wide range of 
industries is collected. The mean of IPO initial returns are equal to 84%, which is 
approximately the half of the results received by Liu and Li (2000). They employ a 
39 
series of data before the year 2000 and find that the IPO initial return is rather high 
especially in the start of the twentieth centuary like 1991 and 1992. This may 
because of the inexperience of CSRC in setting price for the new issued offerings in 
the early time. Thus the IPOs have to be priced relatively lower so as to stimulate 
the growth and prosperous of the stock market. However, the main sample period 
in this paper is from 2000 to 2004 within which an intact and mature pricing system 
has already exist in Chinese security exchange. The mean for the logarithm of firms¶ 
offer size is 19.83%. The average portion of offerings owned by government and 
the legal entities is around 49% which indicates that between 2000 and 2004, 
nearly half of the equities are comprised of non-negotiable state-owned shares and 
legal entities shares. The age of the firm between its establishment and IPO listing 
date is averaged at 7 years. The mean for earnings per share of issuer in the year 
of listing is about 1.34. The mean value for turnover rate and lottery ratio which are 
both used to represent the inequality between supply and demand in the Chinese 
stock market is 0.5978 and 0.3599, respectively. The number of employees at the 
time of IPO offering is averaged at 3640. The maximum and minimum values for 
majority of variables do not have huge distinctions except for the earning per share 
and number of employees. To be specific, earnings per share of issuer in the year of 
listing has a maximum value 33 but a minimum value of only -.0827. The company 
of large size owns a maximum of 508168 employees with small firms only have 48 
employees at the time of offering.  
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5.3 Correlation Analysis 
The correlation between the independent and dependent variables will be discussed 
below in table 5.  
Table 5 Correlation matrix between the independent variable and the key 
explanatory variables used 
 
variables IR for model 
one 
IR for model 
two 
IR for model 
three 
IR 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
govret -0.0562 0.0497  
lnoffsize 0,0578 0.1762 -0.0309 
lnage -0.0277 0.1003  
lnIPO time 0.0336 0.0709  
LnIPO value 0.1638 0.0617  
Eps  0.0273 0.0344  
leverage -0.0741 0.0000 0.0788 
turnover 0.3600 0.3746 0.4359 
lottery -0.0715 -0.0488 -0.1908 
No.emplee -0.0630 -0.1706  
Ln capital -0.0367 -0.2109 0.0119 
High-tech -0.1246 -0.1609 0.0715 
Stock exchange -0.0953 0.1149 0.1205 
Underwriter reputation (1&2)  -0.0900 -0.0604 
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In this section, the correlations between the dependent variable initial return and 
the exogenous variables for model one, model two and model three is discussed 
respectively. Primarily, as demonstrated from table 5, the correlations between the 
dependent variable IPO initial return and independent variables fluctuate from the 
lowest 0.0273 for earning per share of issuer in the listing year to the highest 
0.3600 for the turnover ratio. Besides, the value of correlation for turnover ratio, 
IPO value, registered capitals at the time of offering and the stock exchange is 
relatively higher than other variables. Among them, turnover ratio has the highest 
correlation with a plus sign as expected which indicates that the IPO initial return is 
usually high if the trading frequency for certain shares on the first day are high. 
Thus it can be speculated that these four independent variables may become 
stochastically significant predictors in the later regression models.  
 
In the second place, the sample period for model two and three shrinks to three 
years from 2002 to 2004 with the involvement of another variable known as the 
underwriter reputation. Under this circumstance, the value of correlation between 
IPO initial return and firmV¶ leverage become zero which demonstrates that the 
leverage computed as a ratio of companies¶ total debts on their total assets possibly 
has no direct impact on the degree of IPO underpricing. While as table 5 illustrated 
there are also variables with quite high correlations after the participation of 
underwriter reputation measure one, including the firm offer size (0.1762), 
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turnover ratio (0.3746), registered capital (-0.2109) and high-tech products 
(0.1609). Meanwhile, the correlation between the IPO initial return and turnover 
ratio (0.4359), lottery rate (-0.1908) is also noteworthy. Similarly as the above, 
these variables are strongly associated with IPO initial return and are estimated to 
have significant coefficients in the latter regression.  Additionally, the estimated 
signs in table 5 are also of some importance in forecasting the relationship between 
the dependent and independent variables. Moreover, the problem of perfect 
collinearity between the explanatory variables does not exist in all of the three 
models since none of the correlation values of independent variables lie between 
the 0.75 and 1 no matter positive or negative, this can be seen form appenix.  
 
5.4 Cross-sectional OLS Regression Analysis 
 
Eventually, in this section, each of the control variables within the regression will be 
progressively elaborated. The three OLS regression models employed to explain 
the underpricing of IPOs are presented as the following: 
 
IR1=Į0+Į1govret+Į2lnoffsize+Į3lnage+Į4lnIPOtime+Į5LnIPOvalue+Į6EPS+Į7leve
rage+Į8turnover+Į9lottery+Į10no.emplee+Į11 lncapital +Į12 high-tech + Į13exg + 
Ǎi 
 
IR2=Į0+Į1govret+Į2lnoffsize+Į3lnage+Į4lnIPOtime+Į5LnIPOvalue+Į6EPS+Į7leve
rage+Į8turnover+Į9lottery+Į10no.emplee+Į11 lncapital +Į12 high-tech + Į13exg 
+Į14UW + Ǎi 
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IR3=Į0+Į1lnoffsize+Į2leverage Į3turnover+Į4lottery+Į5Lncapital + 
Į6high-tech+Į7exg+Į8 UW2 + Ǎi 
 
All the consequences of the above two regressions on the initial return of IPOs 
without the problem of heteroskedasticity are presented in table 6 and 7. Table 6 
shows the evaluation results for all the explanatory variables in the sample period 
except the underwriter reputation which is described in table 7 and table 8 within 
the sub-period from 2002 to 2004. Table 6 shows the factors that are utilized to 
explain the level of IPO underpricing in Chinese stock market. 
 
Table 6 The OLS regression results of IPO underpricing from 2000ü 2004  
 
Dependent variable   IR Model one 
coefficient t-statistic P-value Expected 
sign 
Control variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Intercept 
Govret 
Lnoffsize 
Lnage 
Lnipotime 
Lnipova 
Eps 
-.4000 
-.0045 
-.0077 
-.0013 
.0036 
-.0144 
.0005 
-1.54 
-0.25 
-1.03 
-0.17 
 0.75 
-1.49 
 0.24 
0.124 
0.800 
0.046** 
0.868 
0.454 
0.136 
0.809 
 
+ orˉ 
ˉ 
ˉ 
+ 
ˉ 
+ 
44 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R2 
Adjusted R2 
F- statistic 
P>F  
Leverage 
Turnover 
Lottery 
No.emplee 
Lncapit 
High-tech 
Exg 
 
 
 
 
 
-.0645 
.2679 
-.0144 
 
-.0049 
.0312 
.0276 
 
 
 
 
 
 2.11 
 5.44 
-1.96 
-1.28 
-0.80 
2.07 
2.25 
 
 
 
 
 
0.036** 
0.000* 
0.041** 
0.203 
0.427 
0.039** 
0.025** 
 
 
 
 
 
+ 
+ 
ˉ 
none 
none 
+ 
+ 
 
0.1909 
0.1532 
5.06 
0.0000 
* ** *** represents the significant level of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively 
This table reveals the regression results based on model one: IR1= Į0Į1 govret 
Į2OQRIIVL]HĮ3OQDJHĮ4OQ,32WLPHĮ5/Q,32YDOXHĮ6(36Į7OHYHUDJHĮ8WXUQRYHUĮ9lotte
U\Į10QRHPSOHHĮ11 lncapital Į12 high-WHFKĮ13H[JǍi 
The dependent variable is the initial return of 293 A-share IPOs traded on both the SHSE 
and SZSE from 2000 to 2004. The explanatory variables including: government retention 
(govret), the proportion of shares owned by the government and legal entities. Offer size of 
IPO issuing companies (lnoffsze), the logarithm of the number f shares multiplied by their 
offer price. The age of IPO listing firms (lnage), it is the computed logarithm of the time 
LQWHUYDOEHWZHHQWKHILUPV¶HVWDEOLVKPent date and the IPO issuing day. Time duration 
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(lnIPO time) which is the time lag between IPO offering and listing day. The value of IPOs 
(IPO value) is the funds and capitals raised by the A-share IPOs. EPS represents the 
earnings per share of issuer in the year of listing. Leverage (lev) of the company is 
FDOFXODWHGDVWKHUDWLRRIILUP¶VWRWDOGHEWVRQWKHWRWDODVVHWVThe turnover rate is a ratio of 
the trade volume on the first trading day on the number of tradable share, it presents the 
trading frequency of certain shares. The lottery rate shows the demand for IPOs and is 
counted as a ratio of successful subscribers on total valid subscribers. Finally , high-tech 
products and stock exchange (exg) are two dummy variables. The value of the high-tech 
variable equals to one when the business scopes of IPO issuing firms contain the high-tech 
products and zero otherwise. EXG=1 when IPOs are listed on shanghai stock exchange 
(SHSE) and zero in Shenzhen stock exchange (SZSE). The coefficients for the explanatory 
variables are kept up to four digits after the decimal point. 
 
5.4.1 Information asymmetry analysis 
 
It can be demonstrated from table 6 that the regression model is properly specified 
with the significant level of 5% and R2 of 39%. According to table 6 there are mainly 
six variables with significant coefficients that can be used to explain the level of IPO 
initial return. Among them, there are two variables are derived from the 
information asymmetry model. With the first one the logarithm of firms¶ offer size 
has a significantly negative coefficient which testifies hypothesis two and concludes 
an inverse relationship EHWZHHQ WKH ILUPV¶ offer size and the level of IPO 
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underpricing. This negative relation can be easily interpreted when the offering size 
is a representation for information asymmetry. If more shares are listed in the 
market, the potential investors and purchasers will be more informative about the 
relative offering conditions and they will thus suffer from less information 
asymmetry and uncertainty ( Mok and Hui, 1998). Additionally, if the offer size is 
regarded as a proxy for the disequilibrium between demand and supply, it can be 
assumed that the extent of imbalance will be decreased with the augment in IPO 
offer size and the investors will thereby being entitled to increase their retention of 
certain shares. Consequently, the degree of IPO underpricing will be minimized to 
some extent. 
 
The second variable represents information asymmetry with a significant level of 5% 
is the high-tech product which is positively related to the level of IPO underpricing 
as expected in hypothesis three. This demonstrates that investors tend to expect a 
better pricing and operating performance as well as more developing opportunities 
for those IPO offering companies whose business scope contain high-tech products. 
Therefore, the potential investors prefer to take the extra risk brought by the 
high-tech products provided that the IPO issuing firms are likely to underprice their 
new offerings to compensate for these investors. Consequently, the IPOs issuing 
firms comprised of high-tech production are normally signaling a high level of 
underpricing. Hypothesis three are thereby proving to be reasonable as indicating 
a positive relationship between the high-tech products and the IPO initial return. 
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5.4.2 The Imbalance of Supply and Demand Theory 
 
As described in the former section, there are two variables named turnover and 
lottery ratio that can be utilized as proxies for the unbalanced provision and 
requirements for certain IPOs. Primarily, it can be concluded from table 3 that the 
turnover ratio has the most significant positive relationship (significance level 1%) 
with the underpricing of IPOs in the sample period. This ratio is a proxy for the 
trading frequency of new offerings on the stock market, it reflects not only the 
interests of investors on certain shares, it also demonstrates that the more 
frequent the shares are traded, the higher their listing prices will be and the degree 
of underpricing is consequently higher in comparison with the prices of offerings. 
According to table 6, the initial return of IPOs will increase by 0.2679% with one 
unit growth in the turnover ratio. Therefore, the specific offerings with more 
popularity among investors are definitely a powerful explanatory reason for the 
high level of IPO underpricing in the Chinese stock market. 
 
The odds of winning the lottery is another variable with a significant level of 5% and 
has a negative correlation with the initial return of IPOs. Such an inverse 
relationship can be illustrated by the imbalance of supply and demand for shares in 
China. To be specific, the fewer the inequality of the supply and demand, the higher 
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the lottery ratio and hence the lower the extent of IPO underpricing.  The 
coefficient for Į9 is negative may be due to the specific bandwagon effect existing in 
the Chinese stock market. Chi and Padgget (2004) find that group-orientation is a 
special characteristic for Chinese people including stock investors. It is not readily 
for them to buy shares which are not popular and attractive to their competitors, 
even though they have already had favorable information concerning those shares. 
Additionally, the offer size of IPO issuing firms can also be employed as a proxy for 
this inequality and it is found to have a significantly inverse correlation with the 
initial return of IPOs in table 6. 
 
In addition to the significant values discussed above, there are still two factors as 
shown from table 6 with significant coefficients that can be used to explain the level 
of IPO underpricing in the Chinese stock market. Specifically, they are the leverage 
of IPO offering firms which is measured by the total debts to total asset ratio and 
the stock exchange. leverage takes a t-value of 0.036 which is much lower than the 
conventional significance level of 5% and has a positive relationship with the level 
of IPO underpricing. Namely, the low value of a firm¶s leverage naturally indicates a 
low degree of IPO underpricing. According to the framework of Su (2003), the 
corporations with lower leverage rates are usually of greater operating quality, they 
tend to price new offerings on the basis of their intrinsic values and the level of IPO 
underpricing is thereby becoming lower. On the contrary, those companies with 
high ratio of leverage are of low quality and the prices of IPOs set by them are right 
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below the firms¶ intrinsic value. Such a price will in return be the compensations for 
the investors who are suffering from the risk of information uncertainty by exposing 
their money to a long-term adventure. 
 
Eventually, the estimated coefficient for stock exchange is also significantly positive 
at level 5%, which shows that issuers in Shenzhen stock exchange are inclined to 
underprice their new offerings more than the issuers in shanghai stock exchange do. 
According to table 6, the IPOs that are listing in SHSE will normally have a higher 
initial return than those in SZSE by 2.76%. Therefore, the enterprises listed in 
shanghai security exchange are normally less risky and with relatively lower level of 
IPO underpricing when comparing to that in Shenzhen stock market. This may due 
to the fact that Shanghai stock exchange is a share transaction center mainly for 
companies of large size and are more obedient to the insider control from the 
government. These large companies are suffering from less information 
asymmetry owing to the better financial disclosure capacity and reputation 
provided by the official managers. This will definitely generate a low level of IPO 
underpricing. While Shenzhen security exchange is more suitable for small and 
medium-sized firms with high growth opportunities but high risk to be involved in 
(Su, 2003). This result is completely different to Chi and Padgett (2005) who 
discoveries a significant negative correlation between the stock exchange dummy 
and IPO initial return. He emphasizes that the underpricing level of IPOs in SZST is 
much lower in contrast with that in SHSE since majority of companies listed in SZSE 
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are joint-venture firms which are characterized as more disclosure and less 
uncertain. Therefore, the offerings listed on Shenzhen stock exchange tend to be 
less underpriced. 
 
5.4.3 The Signalling Model 
 
Apart from the six significant explanatory variables discussed above, the 
coefficients for all the surplus independent variables (remainders) are not 
stochastically significant including the two variables representing the signaling 
model. Hence, these factors are not capable of explaining the magnitude of the IPO 
underpricing. Hence, the obtained sign of coefficients are not qualified to describe 
the correlation between these variables and the IPO initial return. There should be 
some reasons for these insignificant values.  
As an implication of the signaling model, the earnings per share of the issuer in the 
year of listing are found to have a positive sign in table 6 as anticipated though this 
variable is stochastically insignificant. According to Welch (1989), such a positive 
mark is an indicator for the governments¶ intention of signaling the quality of IPO 
issuing companies by underpricing their offerings. Namely, if the government has 
the intent to inform the potential investors about the firm¶s quality, the correlation 
between the earnings per share and the underpricing of IPOs should be positive. 
Therefore, it can be summarized from the insignificant value of earnings per share 
that the state has no interest to send signals to the stock market when setting 
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prices for the new offerings and the IPO initial return is not a function of companies¶ 
earnings performance during the period between the offering and listing date of 
IPOs. There are two probable reasons for this insignificant result. Firstly, it is 
possible that the government is not very skillful in setting prices for the new-issued 
offerings. Even if it attempts to signal using prices, it fails. Secondly, the 
government is intentionally averaging the prices of IPOs, since all the issuers 
belong to the government, and it cannot give certain companies preference over 
others (Su and Padgett, 2005). The coefficient for funds and capitals raised by IPOs 
is also insignificant with a P-value of 0.136. As a proxy for the signaling model, this 
variable is conform to have no significant influence on the underpricing of IPOs in 
the Chinese stock market and the null of hypothesis six will thus be rejected. 
 
5.4.4 Analyses of the Other Remained Insignificant Factors 
 
The proportion of shares owned by government and legal entities is employed as 
explanatory variables for the test of information asymmetry in the Chinese stock 
market. It can be seen from table 3 that the government and legal entities¶ 
retention get a negative sign as expected though without a significant coefficient. 
This results is consistent with that of Guo and Brooks (2008) who contend that the 
more offerings owned by government and legal entities, the less risk and 
information uncertainty confronted by the investors and thus the lower the level of 
IPO underpricing. Meanwhile this negative sign is supportive of the former 
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assumption of this paper that the government is initially more informative about 
the issuing firm¶s quality and the extent of market risk than the potential investors, 
therefore, it is appropriate and sensible for the government to underprice their new 
offerings so as to attract more IPO purchasers in. Thus the first hypothesis should 
be rejected within the sample period 2000 to 2004 and conclude that there is no 
clarified relationship between IPO initial return and government ownership. 
 
As illustrated from table 3, because of the insignificant coefficient of the logarithm 
of firm age, the estimated subtraction sign become nugatory in explaining the 
correlation between firm age and the degree of IPO underpricing. Therefore, the 
null of hypothesis four is not conformed. Time lag between the date of IPO offering 
and trading acquired a positive mark for its coefficient although it is insignificant. 
Thus the null in hypothesis five stating that the duration time between the IPO 
subscription and listing has a positive relationship with the IPO initial return should 
be rejected. A possible explanation for this insignificant correlation coefficient is 
suggested by Chowdhry and Sherman (1996), who claims that the level of IPO 
underpricing will be high if the time lag between the offering and listing date of IPOs 
is long, this may due to the probability of information disclosure and leakage. 
Meanwhile, as shown in the forth appendix, there is a significantly positive 
correlation between IPO underpricing and the time lag from the prospectus to the 
real trading date for new shares in the previous years since the time duration was 
quite long at that moment. However, the sample period for this paper is from 2000 
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to 2004, within which the time interval is not as extremely long as in the past few 
years. The average time gap is 20 days and it fluctuates from 15 to 27 days. Thus 
the decreased time duration between IPO offering and listing date in the sample 
period can be regarded as a conceivable reason to explain the insignificance of the 
coefficient for IPO time duration. Moreover, the changes of time elapse also 
indicates that time gap will have no influence on the level of IPO underpricing if the 
shares can always be listed in a rational span of time in the Chinese stock market. 
(Guo and Brooks, 2008)  
 
The estimated results for both the registered capital at the time of offering and the 
number of employees at the time of offering is insignificant thus they have no 
econometrical power to explain the magnitude of IPO unerpricing in the Chinese 
stock market. Additionally, although the age of IPO issuing firms has a negative 
sign as expected, it does not seem to relate to the IPO initial return due to its 
insignificant coefficient. The potential investors in China do not treat firm age as a 
relevant factor to explain the level of IPO underpricing.  
 
To conclude from the first regression model in table 6, the estimated consequences 
proves the conjecture of the information asymmetric theory which holds that the 
extent of uncerpricing for those offerings with more ex ante uncertainty and risk is 
usually greater than those low risk shares with less uncertainty. Therefore, the 
information asymmetry methodology is to some extent useful to explain the 
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underpricing of IPOs in Chinese stock market as all the variables including the offer 
size, time lag, government and legal entities ownership besides the firm age are 
stochastically significant. In addition, As indicated from the regression results in 
table 6, all of three variables proxied the disequilibrium between supply and 
demand are significant at the level of 5%, they are turnover ratio, lottery rate and 
the logarithm of firms¶ offer size. This proves the former speculation that the 
imbalance of supply and demand in the Chinese stock market has a significant 
impact on the underpricing of IPOs.  
 
Furthermore, the two variables derived from the signaling model are both 
insignificant although with the expected sign, the null of hypothesis six and seven 
should thus be rejected. It is proper to contend that both the funds raised by issuing 
IPOs and earnings per share of issuer in the year of listing have no direct impact on 
the value of IPO initial return. Namely, the signaling model has no explanatory 
power for the underpricing of IPOs in Chinese stock market within the sample 
period between 2000 and 2004.  
 
5.5 The Sub-sample Analysis with the Involvement of Underwriter 
Reputation 
 
Whether underwriter reputation can be utilized as a vital and proper factor to 
explain level of IPO underpricing in Chinese market remains to be a controversial 
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issue. Some scholars like (Yu and Tse, 2005) contend that since the majority of 
Chinese A-share issues are underwritten and subscribed by the domestic 
stated-owned corporations, the underwriter reputation should not be utilized to 
explain the level of underpricing of Chinese IPOs. However, the other scholars like 
Chen et al. (2004), Su and Bangassa (2011) still employed the underwriter 
reputation as a dummy variable although majority of them found an insignificant 
correlation coefficient for this factor. They usually use the top six or top ten 
underwriter reputation as a dummy variable. While in this paper, two new 
measurements recommended by Su and Bangassa (2011) are adopted with the 
first one is a ratio of the gross proceeds and the second measurement is the 
number of employees subscribed by specific underwriters. 
 
5.5.1 The Analysis of Regression Results with the first Measurement of 
Underwriter Reputation 
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Table 7 the OLS regression results of IPO underpricing with the first measurement 
of uderwriter reputation from 2002 to 2004. 
 
Dependent variable   IR 
 
Model two 
coefficient t-statistic P-value Expected 
sign 
Control variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Intercept 
Govret 
Lnoffsize 
Lnage 
Lnipotime 
Lnipova 
Eps 
Leverage 
Turnover 
Lottery 
No.emplee 
Lncapit 
High-tech 
Exg 
UW1 
 
0.1866  
0.0147 
-0.0087 
-0.0095 
0.0068 
-0.0094 
0.0032 
0.0178 
0.2498 
-0.0057 
 
-0.0160 
0.0189 
0.0449 
-0.0026 
 
0.50 
0.68 
-1.18 
-0.99 
1.27 
-0.70 
0.82 
0.52 
4.21 
-0.24 
0.23 
-2.16 
1,20 
1.32 
-1.22 
 
0.622 
0.501 
0.041** 
0.326 
0.208 
0.488 
0.413 
0.602 
0.000* 
0.180 
0.818 
0.033** 
0.023** 
0.088*** 
0.226 
 
ˉ 
ˉ 
ˉ 
+ 
ˉ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
ˉ 
 
 
+ 
+ 
ˉ 
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R2 
Adjusted R2 
F- statistic 
P>F  
 0.3060 
0.2048 
3.02 
0.0007 
* ** *** represents the significant level of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. The explanatory 
variables utilized are the same as described in table 6. The results are based on regression 
model two: IR2=Į0 +Į1govret+Į2lnoffsize+Į3lnage+Į4lnIPOtime+Į5LnIPOvalue +Į6EPS+ 
Į7leverage+Į8turnover+Į9lottery+Į10no.emplee+Į11 lncapital +Į12 high-tech + Į13exg 
+Į14UW1 + ʇi  The new added underwriter reputation is the gross proceeds subscribed by 
certain underwriters on the total proceeds raised by the market. 
In comparison to the first regression model in table 6, the second model receives 
altogether five significant correlation coefficients, including offer size and high-tech 
products representing for information asymmetry, the turnover ratio and lottery 
rate which are proxies for the inequality between supply and demand as well as the 
logarithm of registered capital at the time of offering. The consequences are similar 
to that of the first regression with only two differences. Specifically, the coefficient 
for IPO issuing firms¶ leverage become insignificant while the coefficient for the 
logarithm of registered capitals at IPO issuing time becomes significant in the 
second regression model with the involvement of underwriter reputation. All the 
other variables remain constant with only a light fluctuation in the value of their 
coefficient. Additionally, the reason for the changed sign for the proportion of 
shares retained by government and legal entities will also be discussed afterwards.  
 
The logarithm of companies¶ offer size also has a significant negative coefficient 
which is approximately 0.1% higher than in the first regression model and it 
58 
indicates that with one unit increase in it, the level of IPO underpricing will 
accordingly decrease by 0.8729%. This inverse relationship between the IPO initial 
return and firms offer size proves the former results in model one and can also be 
explained by the same possible reasons as proposed by Mok and Hui (1998). The 
alternative factor represents the information asymmetry is the high-tech product, it 
is significant at level 5% and is positively related to the underpricing of IPOs. As 
shown from table 5, the firms within whom the high-tech productions are included 
will normally receive a higher initial return than those enterprises without high-tech 
productions in their business scope by 0.1886 which is a bit lower than that in 
regression model one. This consequence is also in accordance with the previous 
ones concluded from model one. Therefore, the information asymmetry theory can 
be utilized to explain the degree of IPO underpricing in Chinese stock market within 
the sub-period from 2002 to 2004. 
 
Apart from the firms¶ offer size which can be adopted as a proxy for the imbalance 
between supply and demand for certain shares in Chinese stock exchange, the 
turnover and lottery rate are also be used to represent this imbalance (Chi and 
Padgett, 2004). As observed in table 7, they both have significant coefficients but 
with different significance level at 1% and 5%, respectively. With the turnover ratio 
remains to be the variable with the most significant coefficient and it has the 
greatest impact on IPO underpricing level since if one unit changes in this ratio, the 
IPO initial return will change positively by 24.98%. While if there is one unit change 
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in the lottery rate, the IPO underpricing level will change negatively by only 
0.5676%. All of these are completely fit the discoveries in the first regression model. 
Hence the possible explanations discussed above can also be used here and the 
specific feature of disequilibrium between demand and supply has a great influence 
on the level of IPO undepricing. 
 
The logarithm of the registered capital at the time of offering is shown to be 
inversely correlated to the initial return of IPOs at a 5% significance level. The IPO 
initial return will alter negatively by 1.6032% with the change of registered capital 
by one unit. This implies that if the IPO issuing firms have more sufficient registered 
capitals, the initial return of IPOs will be lower. However, the coefficient of firms¶ 
leverage rate which is significant as shown in table 6 become insignificant in table 
7. One possible reason to explain the reasons why leverage become not significant 
maybe because of the involvement of underwriter reputation, the capital structure 
of IPO issuing firms will be changed to some extent. The debts of IPO issuing firms 
may be increased under this circumstance which will then lead to a insignificant 
value for the companies¶ leverage ratio.  
 
As illustrated from table 7, the correlation coefficient for the proportion of shares 
owned by the government and legal entities become positive but still insignificant. 
This indication is entirely different from the results in table 6 which shows a 
negative coefficient. However, it is consistent with the studies of chen et al. (2004) 
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who has concluded a positive relationship between the government ownership and 
IPO initial returns. He insists on the notion that the high percentage of shares 
owned by the state will have a passive effect on the firms¶ regular management and 
reduce the working efficiency of certain employees. Meanwhile, since a huge 
amount of shares within a company are owned by the government and legal entities, 
the stock dividend portions that should be allocated to those investors who have 
tradable shares are considerably curtailed. The initial voting rights of these 
investors will also be limited accordingly. The interests and passion of potential 
investors will thus be whittled down (Zhou, 2009). In this condition, the issuers 
have to set a relatively lower price for the new offerings to retain the current 
investors, attract more future purchasers so as to ensure the successful issuing of 
IPOs. Meanwhile according to the second regression, the null of hypothesis one 
should be rejected. The government and legal entities¶ ownership are not capacity 
to explain the extent of IPO underpricing in Chinese stock market. 
 
In conclusion, comparing to the first regression model, this one has merely 
undergone several changes in the coefficient values of the control variables that are 
significant like the registered capital become significant while the coefficient for 
leverage of IPO issuing companies become insignificant as well as the alteration of 
the estimated sign for government and legal entities¶ retention. While all the other 
variables including firm age, time lag, funds raised by IPOs, earnings per share of 
issuer at IPO listing year, number of employees, and stock exchange are remained 
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the same as insignificant as demonstrated from table 6 of regression model one. 
Namely, these variables have no econometrical explanatory power on the 
underpricing of Chinese IPOs.  
 
5.5.2 The Analysis of Regression Results with the Second Measurement of 
Underwriter Reputation 
 
Table 8 the OLS regression results of IPO underpricing with the second 
measurement of uderwriter reputation from 2002 to 2004. 
 
Dependent variable   IR 
 
Model three 
coefficient t-statistic P-value Expected 
sign 
Control variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Intercept 
Lnoffsize 
Leverage 
Turnover 
Lottery 
Lncapit 
High-tech 
Exg 
UW2 
-0.4833 
-0.0198 
0.0521 
0.5208 
-0.1738 
-0.0062 
0.0178 
0.0480 
 
-1.50 
-1.23 
0.93 
5.49 
-1.53 
-0.64 
0.60 
2.35 
-0.46 
0.137 
0.020 
0.055 
0.000 
0.028 
0.524 
0.047 
0.020 
0.649 
 
ˉ 
ˇ 
ˇ 
ˉ 
ˉ 
ˇ 
ˇ 
ˉ 
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R2 
Adjusted R2 
F- statistic 
P>F  
 
 
  
0.2492 
0.2019 
5.27 
0.0000 
* ** *** represents the significant level of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. The explanatory 
variables utilized are the same as described in table 6 and 7. The results are based on 
regression model three IR3=Į0+Į1lnoffsize+Į2leverage Į3turnover+Į4lottery+Į5Lncapital + 
Į6high-tech+Į7exg+Į8 UW2 + ʇi The new-added underwriter reputation is represented by 
the number of IPOs subscribed and managed by certain underwriters. 
 
The third regression model is minimized by containing only those variables with 
significant coefficients in the former two models with the aim to investigate 
whether an alternative measurement of underwriter reputation will have an effect 
on the initial returns of IPO. 
 
As inferred from the precious studies of Carter et al. (1998), the prestigious under 
writers usually have more distinguished skills and experiences in setting the offer 
prices and issuing risk management, thus they can help relieve the severe 
underpricing of IPOs in China. There is also a reciprocal relation between issuers 
and underwriters, especially for those corporations with low dispersion who are 
likely to reflect their advantage of low risk to the stock market by employing the 
outstanding underwriters. These preeminent underwriters in return are 
enthusiastic to work for the low dispersion companies to keep their fine fame. 
However, the new added variable is unfortunately insignificant in both model two 
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and three with a P-value of 0.226 and 0.649, respectively. Hence, there is no clear 
positive or negative correlation is discovered between the underwriter reputation 
and the IPO initial return from the second regression model. This may due to the 
immature IPO trading system with insufficient provision but high demand for IPOs 
in Chinese security market. Guo and Brooks (1998) finds a quite high mean of initial 
return in their sample period and they contend that such a high initial return will 
tempt a vast of investors to participate into the IPO market without any 
consideration concerning the quality of IPO issuing companies and the reputation of 
their underwriters. Therefore, it is inappropriate to employ underwriter reputation 
as the determination of Chinese IPO underpricing no matter which measurement is 
used. This verdict is supportive for the results of Su and Bangassa (2011) who also 
regards underwriter reputation as a useless factor to describe the level of IPO initial 
return in China. 
 
Furthermore, the third regression model is practically consistent with the first 
regression model without the involvement of underwriter reputation, almost all the 
control variables have significant correlation coefficients except the registered 
capital at the time of IPO listing year. This is different from the second regression 
model which demonstrates a significantly positive relationship between the 
registered funds and IPO initial return. Therefore, the third regression model also 
proves the effectiveness of both information asymmetry model and the theory of 
disequilibrium between supply and demand in explaining the relatively high level of 
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IPO underpricing in the Chinese stock exchange.  
 
6. Conclusion  
 
This paper examines the underpricing of 293 A-share IPOs during the period 
2000-2004 in Chinese stock exchange which is developing in a rapid speed and has 
become the second largest security market in Asia. The determinants and variables 
are inferred from the underlying implications of information asymmetry 
assumption, signaling model and the theory holding that an imbalance between the 
supply and demand for IPOs exists in China. Meanwhile, I further analyze the 
significance of underwriter reputation as a control variable to explain the 
underpricing of Chinese IPOs is also discussed with a sub-sample period from 2002 
to 2004 due to the limitation and loss of certain statistics in the previous years. 
Instead of using the normal measurement which uses the top six or ten underwriter 
as a dummy variable, this paper uses two different methods which has been 
recommended by Su and Bangassa (2011) as proxies for underwriter reputation. 
The first one is based on a ratio of the gross proceeds raised and the second 
measurement uses the number of employees managed and subscribed by certain 
underwriters over the sample period which indicates that the larger this number, 
the better the underwriter reputation will be.   
 
By investigating the A-share IPOs for both the sample and sub-sample period, this 
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paper finds that the inequity of supply and demand is a key determinant for the 
relatively high level of underpricing of IPOs in China since the two variables 
turnover and lottery ratio representing this imbalance are both have a significant 
coefficient with the expected sign. The turnover ratio is found to have a significantly 
positive relationship with IPO initial return as the higher trading frequency in the 
first trading day is an indicator of a nice market sentiment and expectation for 
specific shares which will in return lead to a high level of IPO underpricing. 
Meanwhile, the issuing size can also be utilized as a proxy for the disequilibrium of 
supply and demand for IPOs. As exhibited from this paper, the initial returns of IPO 
will be higher if more shares are listed and a lower lottery rate. 
 
Additionally, the information asymmetry theory is also clearly confirmed to be 
useful and significant to explain the undrpricing of IPOs in china. The Hypothesis 
five concerning a positive relationship between time duration and the underpricing 
of IPOs are not confirmed since the correlation coefficient of this variable turns out 
to be insignificant. On the contrary to the expected positive relation, I find that the 
time interval between the IPO prospectus and listing date in the sample period are 
averaged at 20 days without big discrepancies. Furthermore, the findings of this 
paper shows that the proportion of shares owned by government and legal entities 
as well as the age of IPO issuing companies both have acquired insignificant 
coefficients.  
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However, the signaling model is proves to have no direct influence on the initial 
return of Chinese IPOs based on the sample period. Both the two proxies present 
for the signaling model have obtained a insignificant correlation coefficient 
although with the expected sign. Hence, they are not stochastically capable of 
explaining the underpricing of IPOs in the Chinese stock market. This consequence 
exhibits that instead of signaling the market about the quality of issuers by issuing 
the shares at a lower price, the government only captures the opportunities to set 
tome for certain IPOs in order to generate profitable feedbacks from the market. 
 
Eventually, Underwriter reputation is proved to have no direct impact on the 
underpricing of IPOs in Chinese stock market within the sample period. Hence the 
null of Hypothesis eight is also be rejected and it indicates that neither 
measurement for underwriter reputation is significantly related to the IPO initial 
return. This consequence is consistent with that of Su and Bangassa (2011) who 
attribute this to the inadequate provision and huge demand for the new-issued 
offerings.  The other possible reason for this result is the popular money worship in 
Chinese security market which persuades a great crowd of investors to aspire for 
risk-free benefits from the IPOs without any consideration of underwriter 
reputation and IPO firms¶ quality. Besides, one contribution of this article is the 
discovery of a factor known as the registered capital at the time of IPO offering 
which has a significantly negative correlation with the IPO initial return when the 
first measurement of underwriter reputation is taken into consideration in the 
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second regression model. One probable reason for this is with the involvement of 
underwriter reputation, the capital structure of the enterprises may be undergone 
some changes. The more gross proceeds subscribed by the underwriters, the more 
prestigious they are and the less liquid assets will be remained for firms to go public. 
Hence the level of underpricing will be affected in this condition.  
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Appendix ĉ 
 
The appendix ĉ is comprised of the basic data summerization, correlation matrix 
and  
 
Data summerization of the key variables  
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The correlation matrix for the first regression model 
 
 
 
 
Correlation matrix of the second regression model 
 
 
 
Correlation matrix of the second regression model 
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Appendix Ċ 
 
The second appendix exhibits the regression results for all of the three OLS models. 
 
The OLS regression results for the first model  
 
 
The OLS regression results for the second model  
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The OLS regression results for the third model  
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Appendix ċ 
 
 
The white tast is also employed in appendix ċ to check for the heteroskedasticity 
for each of the three model. 
 
 
White test for the first model  
 
 
 
 
White test for the second model  
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White test for the third model  
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Appendix Č 
 
Descriptive statistics of Chinese A-share IPOs¶ duration time from 1990 to 2004 
 
sample 
period 
variable 
names 
sample 
size 
mean min max 
1990 time lag 8 1966 282 2615 
1991 time lag 18 477 11 2119 
1992 time lag 112 643 10 3385 
1993 time lag 142 270 24 3081 
1994 time lag 39 75 25 179 
1995 time lag 13 66 14 292 
1996 time lag 172 20 7 64 
1997 time lag 188 23 9 80 
1998 time lag 102 56 12 382 
1999 time lag 93 57 16 133 
2000 time lag 139 26 10 194 
2001 time lag 67 27 12 87 
2002 time lag 70 15 10 31 
2003 time lag 66 15 13 25 
2004 time lag 98 16 13 28 
Resource: Guo, H. and Brooks, R. (2008) µ Underpricing of Chinese A-share IPOs 
and short-run underperformance under the appURYDOV\VWHPIURPWR¶ 
Int. Rev. Financ. Anal. 17 , 984±997. 
